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Highlights of Domestic Open Market Operations
during 1998
This article is adapted from a report to the Federal
Open Market Committee by Peter R. Fisher, Execu-
tive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and Manager of the System Open Market
Account. Spence Hilton, Assistant Vice President,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, prepared this
article. Angela Goldstein and Wendy Wong provided
research assistance.
The Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York uses open market operations to implement
the policy directives of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC). The FOMC expresses its short-
term objective for open market operations as a target
level for the federal funds rate—the interest rate at
which depository institutions lend balances at the
Federal Reserve to other depository institutions. To
keep the federal funds rate near the level speciﬁed by
the FOMC, the Desk uses open market operations to
bring the supply of balances at the Federal Reserve
into line with the demand for them.
In 1998 the level of balances that depository insti-
tutions were required to hold at the Federal Reserve
continued to slip, to historic lows. The primary rea-
son for this decline was the ongoing proliferation of
retail ‘‘sweep’’ programs, which transfer depositors’
funds from transaction accounts that are subject to
reserve requirements into other deposit accounts that
are not.1 The decline in required balances encouraged
depository institutions to hold more excess reserves
during the year.2
In past years, declines in required balances had
been associated with greater volatility in the federal
funds rate because depository institutions have less
ﬂexibility in managing their daily balance positions.
With lower requirements, a depository institution is
less able to substitute balances across days of the
maintenance period to meet its balance requirement,
which must be met by the average of its holdings
over the period, because the risk of overdrawing its
account at the end of the day is greater.3 However,
through the ﬁrst three quarters of 1998, the funds
rate behaved much as it had in 1997, even though
required balances were lower. In the ﬁnal quarter
of 1998, funds rate volatility and levels of excess
reserves rose when funds market participants evinced
greater concerns about the credit quality of their
counterparties at a time of increased uncertainty in
ﬁnancial markets. These heightened credit concerns
upset normal trading relationships among institu-
tions in the federal funds market, and market partici-
pants were more wary of approaching the Federal
Reserve’s discount window to borrow for fear of
being perceived as being in unsound ﬁnancial condi-
tion, even though the identity of any institution that
borrows is strictly conﬁdential. In this environment,
many depository institutions bid aggressively for bal-
ances at the Federal Reserve, thus lifting the funds
rate, especially early in the day, but often with the
result that the rate fell off in later trading after bor-
rowers became conﬁdent that their demand for bal-
ances would be satisﬁed. The Desk responded to the
upward rate pressure it saw on many mornings by
elevating the levels of excess reserves it provided.
The Desk’s selection of open market operations in
1998 was inﬂuenced by changing market circum-
stances, such as the ongoing decline in required bal-
ances. With the backdrop of falling required bal-
ances, the Desk in managing reserve supply increased
its reliance on very short-term operations. It also
adopted a somewhat different approach to addressing
deep seasonal reserve shortages around the end of the
1. Past annual reports on open market operations have discussed
the growth of sweep accounts and other developments surrounding the
Desk’s operations, and these remained themes in 1998. The annual
report for 1998 and those from other recent years are available
on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(http://www.ny.frb.org).
2. Depository institutions hold balances at the Federal Reserve to
satisfy reserve and other balance requirements. Some institutions also
hold additional balances—called excess reserves—to guard against
unanticipated debits to their accounts at the Federal Reserve that could
leave the account overdrawn at the end of the day or short of the level
needed to satisfy their requirements.
3. For further detail on the operating practices and techniques used
by the Trading Desk, see Cheryl L. Edwards, ‘‘Open Market Opera-
tions in the 1990s,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 83 (November
1997) pp. 859–74; Ann-Marie Meulendyke, U.S. Monetary Policy and
Financial Markets (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1998); and
M. A. Akhtar, Understanding Open Market Operations (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 1997).year—an approach designed to take advantage of
its new authority granted by the FOMC to arrange
temporary transactions with maturities of up to sixty
days. Largely as a consequence, fewer reserves were
added on a permanent basis in 1998 than in 1997.
IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY
IN 1998
Directives of the Federal Open Market
Committee
In 1998 the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) continued to express its operating objective
for monetary policy as a speciﬁc level of the over-
night federal funds rate—the interest rate on inter-
bank loans of balances held on deposit at the Federal
Reserve. After each of its policy meetings, the FOMC
issued a written directive to the Trading Desk,
instructing it to foster conditions in reserve markets
consistent with maintaining the federal funds rate at
an average around the target rate.4 Beginning in
September 1998, the FOMC lowered its target level
for the federal funds rate on three occasions before
the end of the year, each time by 25 basis points. On
two of these occasions the Board of Governors also
approved an equal reduction in the discount rate, the
interest rate that the Federal Reserve charges deposi-
tory institutions for borrowing at its discount window
facility (table 1). The reduction in the funds rate in
September was the ﬁrst time that the FOMC had
changed its target rate since March 1997.
Overview of Operating Procedures
and Practices
In attempting to achieve the FOMC’s target for the
federal funds rate, the New York Trading Desk tries
to align the supply of reserve balances with the level
of demand believed consistent with maintaining the
funds rate around its target level (see box ‘‘Mainte-
nance Periods and the Desk’s Nonborrowed Reserve
Objective’’). The Desk is able to alter reserve bal-
ances by engaging in open market operations with
primary dealers of government securities. If the open
4. The directive is released along with the minutes of each FOMC
meeting shortly after the conclusion of the next regularly scheduled
FOMC meeting. The minutes, which contain the directives, are
reprinted in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and are available on the
Board’s web site (http://www.federalreserve.gov).
1. Changes in the federal funds rate speciﬁed in directives
of the Federal Open Market Committee,








March 25, 1997 ................... 5.50 5.00
September 29, 1998 ............... 5.25 5.00
October 15, 1998 .................. 5.00 1 4.75
November 17, 1998 ............... 4.75 4.50
1. First change made between regular Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meetings since April 18, 1994.
Maintenance Periods and the Desk’s
Nonborrowed Reserve Objective
Each depository institution is required to hold reserves,
either in the form of vault cash or balances at the Federal
Reserve, in a ﬁxed proportion to certain of its deposit
liabilities. Two-week computation periods establish the
time frame over which institutions’ deposit levels are
averaged for the purpose of calculating their reserve
requirements. Two-week maintenance periods deﬁne the
time frame over which institutions can accumulate daily
balances at the Federal Reserve to meet the portion of
their period-average reserve requirements that is not met
with vault cash.
The nonborrowed reserve objective, or ‘‘path,’’ that the
Desk estimates for each maintenance period is a measure
of the level of nonborrowed reserves—vault cash and
reserve balances created through sources other than bor-
rowing at the Federal Reserve’s discount window—that
is associated with maintaining the federal funds rate
around the target. This path captures the average demand
for reserves for that period arising from reserve require-
ments plus the estimated demand for excess reserves, less
an allowance for expected discount window borrowing
associated with the funds rate remaining at its objective.
Reserve requirements are known at the start of each
maintenance period based on deposit information that
banks provide to the Federal Reserve, but demand for
excess reserves and borrowing from the discount window
are estimated or anticipated on the basis of experience.
The difference between the path and estimates of average
reserve supply for the period provides a general indica-
tion of the overall need for open market operations to
bring reserve supply in line with demand over the main-
tenance period. The speciﬁc operations chosen by the
Desk are driven largely by the estimated daily patterns
of both demand and supply and the observed behavior of
the funds rate. As a maintenance period progresses, the
allowances for excess reserves and borrowing are revised
when incoming information suggests that they are incon-
sistent with maintaining the funds rate around the
FOMC’s target.
218 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1999market operation is intended to add reserve balances,
the Desk agrees to buy securities from one or more
dealers. When the dealers deliver the agreed-upon
securities to the Desk, it credits the dealers’ accounts
at their clearing banks, a process that creates reserve
balances. If the operation is intended to drain
reserves, the Desk sells securities, and reserve bal-
ances are extinguished.
Each morning the Desk considers whether an open
market operation is needed on the basis of estimates
of the demand for and supply of reserves. Any opera-
tion designed to alter reserve balances that same day
is typically arranged shortly thereafter. Reserve needs
in upcoming days and weeks are also considered and
sometimes inﬂuence the choice of operations, as does
an assessment of possible errors in the forecasts of
demand for and supply of reserves. Current trading
conditions in the funds market, which can shed light
on reserve imbalances, also play a role in determin-
ing the structure of open market operations. When
selecting open market operations, the Desk views its
objective as keeping the funds rate on current and
future days as close to the target as possible, but it
does not target an average rate over any preset time
frame and thereby try to create high rates to offset
low rates on past days, or vice versa.
New Developments in 1998
Two important changes in 1998 affected the Desk’s
conduct of open market operations. The Board of
Governors approved a return to lagged reserve
requirements (LRR) beginning with the maintenance
period ended August 12, 1998. LRR replaced con-
temporaneous reserve requirements (CRR), which
had been in place since 1984. LRR are designed to
improve the Desk’s ability to estimate the demand for
reserves to meet requirements and thus help it cali-
brate open market operations. Under LRR, a deposi-
tory institution’s reserve requirement depends on its
average reservable deposit liabilities in a two-week
computation period that ends seventeen days before
the start of the corresponding reserve maintenance
period. At the same time, the computation period for
applied vault cash, which was lagged one period even
under CRR, was shifted back further to coincide with
the computation period for reservable deposit liabili-
ties. Thus, under LRR, the Desk knows with virtual
certainty the aggregate level of reserve requirements
at the outset of each maintenance period, and each
depository institution knows the average level of
required reserve balances it must hold over the
period.
The second change involved the maximum length
of repurchase agreements (RPs) permitted by the
FOMC in its authorization for domestic open market
operations. At its November meeting, the FOMC
extended the maximum maturity of RPs that the Desk
may arrange to sixty calendar days from the previous
ﬁfteen-day limit.5 RPs are agreements that the Desk
makes with government securities dealers to pur-
chase securities and then to sell the same securities
back to the dealers on a speciﬁed date at a predeter-
mined price. These operations are useful for increas-
ing reserves on a temporary basis. The lengthening of
the maturity limit provides the Desk with additional
means for addressing reserve shortages that are tem-
porary but that are certain to exceed in length the
ﬁfteen-day maturity previously set for RPs. The use
of long-term RPs in 1998 is discussed later in this
article.
Sweep Programs and Total Required Balances
Since 1994 depository institutions have used retail
sweep programs to reduce the amount of balances
they must hold at the Federal Reserve to meet reserve
requirements. Under these programs, depository insti-
tutions shift their customers’ funds from checking
accounts that are reservable into special-purpose
money market deposit accounts that are not reserv-
able. Thus, depository institutions can decrease the
level of their deposits subject to reserve requirements
and, with no change in their vault cash holdings, their
total required balances, on which they earn no inter-
est. Sweep programs are proﬁtable because deposi-
tory institutions can invest the balances that they are
no longer required to hold in interest-bearing assets.6
The adoption of sweep programs over the past few
years has led to a signiﬁcant decrease in required
reserves and required balances.7
In 1998, the spread of sweep programs slowed as
the proportion of deposit accounts not already cov-
5. The authorization is reprinted in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
with the minutes from the ﬁrst FOMC meeting each year. For the text
of the authorization in place at the end of 1998, see ‘‘Minutes of
the Federal Open Market Committee Meeting Held on Novem-
ber 17, 1998,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 85 (February 1999),
pp. 122–23.
6. For further information on sweep programs, see Edwards, ‘‘Open
Market Operations in the 1990s,’’ p. 870.
7. Total required balances consist of required reserve balances and
required clearing balances. Required reserve balances are the portion
of a depository institution’s reserve requirement that is not satisﬁed
with vault cash. Required clearing balances are balances depository
institutions agree in advance to hold at the Federal Reserve, usually to
facilitate payments.
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sion of sweep programs became less proﬁtable for
institutions that began to meet their entire reserve
requirement with vault cash. The level of deposits
affected by new or expanded sweep programs in 1998
rose $60 billion, an increase that was nearly $25 bil-
lion less than that of 1997 and about half that of 1996
(chart 1).8 Demand deposits and other checkable
deposits fell moderately, by $34 billion, as the depres-
sing effect of sweeps was partly countered by higher
demand for liquid balances arising from the more
rapid growth of income and declining opportu-
nity costs of holding money.9 As a result, required
reserves fell $31⁄2 billion on balance between the
ﬁnal maintenance period of 1997 and that of 1998
(chart 2). Also during this period, applied vault cash
fell $1 billion and required clearing balances were
little changed, so that total required balances dropped
$21⁄2 billion.
The decline in total required balances in 1998 was
similar in size to the $23⁄4 billion drop of 1997, but
much less than the $6 billion fall in 1996. However,
comparing changes in these reserve measures in 1998
with changes in earlier years is complicated by the
switch to LRR, which altered the lags between move-
ments in required reserves and applied vault cash and
the underlying seasonal swings in demand deposits
and currency around the year-end.10 Absent this
effect, total required balances would have shown a
much smaller decline in 1998.
The slowing pace of decline in total required bal-
ances reﬂects both the ebbing in the spread of sweep
programs and the fact that an increasing number of
new sweep programs were byproducts of efforts to
reduce vault cash holdings and were not intended to
reduce required reserve balances.11
8. These ﬁgures apply to deposits initially swept by banks at the
start of a program or when the coverage was expanded. The data are
not updated to include any later changes in the underlying deposit
balances included in an existing program.
9. The change in deposits is measured using not seasonally
adjusted data from December 1997 to November 1998. The decline
over this period best correlates with the change in reserve require-
ments over the year because the switch to LRR created a lag of about
one month between deposit levels and reserve requirements.
10. The shift to LRR left the level of reserve requirements in the
ﬁnal maintenance period of 1998 about $2 billion below the level it
would have been under CRR because the seasonal rise in requirements
that typically occurred in the ﬁnal maintenance period of the year
under CRR occurs about two maintenance periods later under LRR.
For related reasons, the move to LRR left the level of applied vault
cash in the ﬁnal maintenance period of the year about $3⁄4 billion
higher than it otherwise would have been.
11. A bank can proﬁt by reducing its vault cash holdings because it
earns no interest on these assets. If the eliminated vault cash had been
used to meet reserve requirements, the bank can use a sweep program
to reduce its reserve requirements simultaneously; without the sweep
program the bank would have to hold more non-interest-bearing
balances at the Federal Reserve in place of vault cash to meet its
reserve requirements.
1. Deposits affected by new or expanded sweep programs, 1995–98










Note. Data are monthly averages.
2. Reserve measures, 1995–98













Note. All ﬁgures are maintenance-period averages calculated at two-week
intervals. Required reserves are the sum of required reserve balances and
applied vault cash. Total required balances are the sum of required reserve
balances and required clearing balances.
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OPEN MARKET ACOUNT
In 1998 the portfolio of domestic securities held
in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) grew
$25 billion, to $473 billion at year-end (chart 3).12
Most of the expansion was achieved through outright
(permanent) purchases of securities made by the Desk
in the market, with a small portion obtained through
purchases from foreign accounts.
Changes in the Size of the System Open
Market Account
The Desk increased the SOMA portfolio to offset the
effect of movements in operating factors on nonbor-
rowed reserve supply. Operating factors (listed in
table 2), which are sometimes called technical fac-
tors, are items on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
other than loans and holdings of domestic securities
that can affect the supply of reserves available to
depository institutions. Movements in these factors
typically prompt the Desk to arrange open market
operations to negate their effect on reserve supply.
The growth in the SOMA this past year was well
below the record $41 billion expansion of 1997,
largely because of differences in the mix of tem-
porary and permanent operations used to address
reserve shortages at year-end.13
12. All ﬁgures on SOMA holdings in this article are par values
unless otherwise stated and exclude any securities held under out-
standing RPs. Reported Treasury bill holdings include the portion
sold to foreign accounts under matched sale–purchase agreements.
Reported changes and levels of Treasury coupon securities do not
include the accrual of compensation for the effects of inﬂation on the
principal of inﬂation-indexed issues. At the end of 1998, these accruals
totaled $79 million, $56 million higher than one year earlier.
13. The attribution of changes in the portfolio from year-end to
year-end either to factor movements over the year or to year-end
reserve management strategies is based on the accounting identity:
PORTend98 - PORTend97 = RPend97 - RPend98 - DFACTORS98
+ RRend98 - RRend97 + ERend98
- ERend97 + BRend97 - BRend98,
where PORT is the size of the portfolio, RP is the value of RP
agreements outstanding, ER is the level of excess reserves, BR is
discount window credit, and RR is the level of reserve requirements,
each for the end of the indicated year. DFACTORS reﬂects the net
effect of changes over 1998 in all operating factors on reserve supply.
Changes in discount window borrowing, which affect reserve supply,
and excess reserve demand were not substantial relative to other
factors during the year and are not considered explicitly in the text. In
the tables and charts in this article, values for the portfolio are taken
from year-end dates while values for RPs outstanding and changes in
factors are based on averages taken from maintenance periods at the
year-end.
3. System portfolio of Treasury and federal agency
securities, 1980–98


















Note. Values for the portfolio are taken from year-end dates.




















circulation ...... 448.1 479.3 514.0 -31.3 -34.7
Foreign currency .... 16.2 16.6 17.4 .4 .8
Foreign RP pool ..... 14.0 17.0 19.4 -3.0 -2.4
Gold and foreign
deposits ........ 20.6 20.1 20.1 -.5 0
Float ................ 2.0 .8 2.6 -1.2 1.8
Treasury balance .... 6.0 4.9 6.3 1.1 -1.4
Applied vault cash ... 38.1 37.7 36.7 -.4 -.9
Required clearing
balances ........ 6.6 6.7 6.6 -.1 0
All other items2 ..... 24.3 23.3 25.4 -1.0 2.1
Net changes in
nonborrowed
factors ......... . . . . . . . . . -36.0 -34.7
Outstanding RPs1
Par value ............ 16.3 10.1 15.2 -6.2 5.1
Premium ............ 1.4 .5 1.1 -.8 .6
Note. A decline in required reserves is counted as a rise in reserve supply.
1. Values for changes in factors and repurchase agreements (RPs) outstand-
ing are based on averages taken from maintenance periods at the year-end.
2. The category ‘‘All other items’’ equals all other assets minus all other
liabilities not listed in the table and excludes the premium on RPs.
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in the SOMA Portfolio
Changes in the Supply of and Demand for
Nonborrowed Reserves
The expansion of the portfolio in 1998 was driven
primarily by the need to offset the reserve drain
caused by continued strong growth of currency in
circulation, which increased nearly $35 billion during
the year and reduced reserve supply by an equivalent
amount (table 2). On balance, the other factors affect-
ing supply were little changed over the year. The
$31⁄2 billion decline in required reserves reduced the
demand for reserves and lessened the need to offset
all of the decline in supply with open market opera-
tions. Altogether, these movements in operating fac-
tors and required reserves deepened reserve shortages
a little more than $30 billion in 1998, slightly less
than their net effect in 1997.
The Effect of Year-End Reserve Management
Strategies
Despite the similarity in net movements in operating
factors in 1997 and 1998, the increase in the SOMA
portfolio in 1998 was much smaller than in 1997
because of shifts in year-end reserve management
strategies. Over the year-end period in each of the
past three years, the Desk has used very differ-
ent combinations of outright purchases and RPs to
address seasonal reserve shortages, which typically
deepen leading up to the year-end and then recede
after the year-end.
Over the 1998 year-end, about $6 billion more of
RPs were used to address reserve shortages than were
used over year-end 1997 (table 2). Total outstanding
RPs over the year-end 1998 period included $8 bil-
lion of long-term operations with maturities longer
than ﬁfteen days. These long-term RPs addressed
some of the deep year-end shortages that were
expected to recede early in 1999. In the absence of
these long-term RPs, more outright purchases would
likely have been undertaken to cover a greater por-
tion of the year-end deﬁciency.
In 1996 the Desk had also made relatively few
outright purchases to address year-end reserve short-
ages, preferring to use more short-term RPs. As a
result of this strategy, outright purchases that other-
wise would have been made late in 1996 were
deferred until early 1997, after the RPs matured. This
postponement of purchases also elevated the total
quantity of outright purchases made in 1997 relative
to the amounts in other recent years.
Outright Market Activity Affecting the SOMA
Portfolio
Virtually all of the expansion of the portfolio in
1998 was achieved through $26.4 billion of outright
purchases—entirely of Treasury coupon securities—
made in the market (chart 4). Because of the rela-
tively low level of Treasury bill issuance over the
past two years, the Desk refrained from making pur-
chases of bills in the market out of concern that any
reduction in the supply of bills held by the public
might further diminish bill market liquidity. At the
same time, existing bill holdings in the portfolio were
viewed as sufﬁcient for addressing any contingency.
In purchasing Treasury coupon securities in the
market, the Desk continued to segment its purchases
into separate tranches covering different portions of
the yield curve. Beginning in October, the Desk took
steps to reduce further the price effect of its opera-
tions by narrowing the maturity range of issues con-
sidered for any one operation. This step was intended
to limit the number of issues and thereby the total
number of offerings or propositions by the Desk’s
4. System portfolio of Treasury and federal agency








































Purchases from foreign accounts
Purchases in the market
Redemptions
Note. Purchases are positive values; redemptions are negative values.
222 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1999counterparties—the primary dealers—that would
have to be evaluated in the selection process. The
total value of purchases made in each operation was
reduced accordingly. This modiﬁcation permitted
faster turnaround times, which is a factor in the
competitiveness of the propositions the Desk re-
ceives, and also helped to reduce further any effect of
the Desk’s operations on market prices. At the same
time, in the messages announcing operations that are
sent to the primary dealers, the Desk began to specify
those issues within the maturity range that it would
not purchase because of portfolio considerations.
Specifying these issues in the announcements simpli-
ﬁed the submission and selection process further for
the Desk’s counterparties.
In November, the Desk limited one of the tranches,
to Treasury inﬂation-indexed securities (TIISs) for
the ﬁrst time. The Desk judged that the different asset
characteristics and market trading dynamics of TIISs
warranted their separation from the operations in
nominal coupon issues. Previously, the Desk had
considered propositions on TIISs and nominal cou-
pon issues together so long as they were in the
speciﬁed maturity range of a tranche, and it had
purchased $100 million of inﬂation-indexed securi-
ties in one operation in 1997. But the Desk had found
it difﬁcult to make relative value judgements between
inﬂation-indexed and nominal coupon issues during
the process of selecting propositions.
Other Activity Affecting the Size of the SOMA
Portfolio
Besides its market purchases, the Desk acquired secu-
rities through transactions with foreign accounts, and
it shrank some of its securities holdings through
redemptions. Many foreign central banks and inter-
national organizations have custodial accounts at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the FOMC
authorizes the Desk to transact with these foreign
account holders. When the foreign account holders
have securities to sell, the Desk may purchase these
securities if doing so is consistent with reserve needs.
The Desk accquired $3.6 billion of Treasury bills
through such purchases in 1998.
The SOMA portfolio contains publicly offered U.S.
Treasury securities. When these securities mature,
the Desk is permitted to exchange them for new
securities that settle on the same day. In 1998, when
more than one auction for new securities settled on
one of these dates, the distribution of issues newly
acquired by the Desk was proportional to the amounts
the Treasury was issuing to the public. The Desk can
also tender for fewer securities than mature on an
auction settlement date, but it cannot tender for more.
Early in 1998, the Desk redeemed $2 billion in
Treasury bills by letting them mature without replace-
ment to address seasonal reserve surpluses. It also
redeemed a portion of its holdings of original-issue
seven-year notes (which are no longer issued). The
Desk held $4.3 billion of such notes that matured
during the year, all on dates when new Treasury
inﬂation-indexed securities settled. Altogether, the
Desk exchanged $1.6 billion of the maturing seven-
year notes for TIISs, equal in value to 5 percent of the
amount issued to the public, while the remaining
$2.7 billion of the maturing notes was redeemed.
About $300 million of federal agency securities
was redeemed in 1998 as part of the SOMA’s ongo-
ing reduction of its holdings of agency securities. The
Desk also sold $25 million of agency debt back to the
original issuer as part of that agency’s program to
retire or replace a portion of its outstanding debt. At
the end of the year, SOMA agency holdings had
fallen to a little more than $300 million.
SOMA Portfolio Management
As in 1997, the overall expansion of the domestic
portfolio in 1998 was in holdings of Treasury coupon
securities. The declining share of short-term Treasury
bills held in the portfolio increased the average matu-
rity of all Treasury issues in the SOMA at year-end
to forty-seven months, compared with forty-three
months at year-end 1997 (table 3). At the end of
1998, 14 percent of the volume of all outstanding
marketable Treasury debt was held in the SOMA
portfolio, up a bit from 13 percent one year earlier.
3. Weighted-average maturity of marketable Treasury debt,
selected years, 1960–98
Months
Year-end Holdings in the System
Open Market Account Total outstanding debt
1960 ................. 19 55
1965 ................. 16 60
1970 ................. 24 40
1975 ................. 31 33
1980 ................. 55 48
1985 ................. 49 59
1990 ................. 41 68
1991 ................. 31 68
1992 ................. 36 67
1993 ................. 38 65
1994 ................. 38 66
1995 ................. 39 63
1996 ................. 41 63
1997 ................. 43 65
1998 ................. 47 68
Note. The effects of all outstanding temporary transactions on System Open
Market Account (SOMA) holdings are excluded from the calculation. The
maturity of total outstanding Treasury debt for 1998 is as of the end of the ﬁscal
year.
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was held in the portfolio increased to 31 percent
at the end of 1998 from about 30 percent in 1997,
reﬂecting the decline in the volume of bills outstand-
ing. A little more than 9 percent of the total outstand-
ing volume of coupon issues, including TIISs, was
held in the portfolio at the end of 1998, about 1 per-
centage point more than a year earlier.
TEMPORARY TRANSACTIONS FOR THE SYSTEM
OPEN MARKET ACCOUNT
Period-Average Reserve Needs and Revisions
The difference between the path and the estimated
supply of nonborrowed reserves at the outset of each
two-week maintenance period, after incorporating the
effects of any outright operations arranged previ-
ously, indicates the need for open market operations
during that period. In 1998 the estimates of the
period-average reserve needs made at the start of
each maintenance period—in absolute value to allow
for temporary reserve surpluses—averaged $5.3 bil-
lion, down from $8.0 billion in 1997 (chart 5).14 The
decline in the average was partly the byproduct of the
higher volume of outright purchases made in 1997,
which left smaller reserve imbalances early in 1998
than had existed early in 1997.
Revisions to estimates of operating factors affect-
ing the supply of or demand for reserves during a
period affect the actual size of temporary operations
needed during that maintenance period. Therefore,
the Desk must allow for the possibility of such revi-
sions in structuring its operations as it goes through a
period. Net revisions to operating factors affecting
the supply of reserve balances over an entire period
tended to be less in 1998 than in other recent years,
largely reﬂecting smaller Treasury balance revisions
(table 4). At the same time, revisions to key determi-
nants of the demand for balances at the Federal
Reserve—required reserves and applied vault cash—
were virtually eliminated with the advent of LRR in
August. Before the introduction of LRR, sizable revi-
sions to required reserves and applied vault cash
sometimes were made relatively late in a period,
which was a major source of uncertainty. Thus the
Desk had to take the uncertainty in these estimates
into account when structuring its operations late in a
period.
Daily Volatility of and Projection Errors for
the Supply of and Demand for Reserves
The decline in total required balances resulting from
the implementation of sweep programs over the past
several years has increased depository institutions’
exposure to overdrafts arising from unanticipated
shifts in their daily reserve positions. As a result, both
the day-to-day swings in factors affecting the supply
14. Some of these initial estimated reserve needs were reduced by
temporary term RPs that were arranged in an earlier maintenance
period and extended into later periods.
5. Open market operations needed to hit the nonborrowed
reserve path, 1995–98







Note. Estimates are from the ﬁrst day of each maintenance period. Positive
numbers indicate a need to add reserves.
4. Revisions to estimates of open market operations needed
to hit the nonborrowed reserve path, 1997–98
Millions of dollars, maintenance-period averages
Item 1997 1998
Factors affecting the supply
of reserve balances
at the Federal Reserve
Treasury balance ........................ 1,002 506
Currency in circulation ................... 361 500
Foreign RP pool ......................... 500 381
Float .................................... 227 312
Net factor revision ....................... 1,413 1,034
Factors affecting the demand
for reserve balances
at the Federal Reserve1
Required reserves
Before LRR ........................... 443 353
After LRR ............................ . . . 22
Applied vault cash
Before LRR ........................... 231 316
After LRR ............................ . . . 12
Required reserves–applied vault cash
Before LRR ........................... 352 182
After LRR ............................ . . . 25
Note. Data are average absolute revisions to initial estimates of
maintenance-period-average values. Projection errors are based on estimates by
the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
1. All revisions in 1997 were before the introduction of lagged reserve
requirements (LRR); revisions in 1998 through the period ending July 29 were
before LRR.
224 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1999of reserve balances and the potential for error in the
projections of these factors have taken on a greater
role in the Desk’s daily reserve management delibera-
tions.15 For the same reason, the day-to-day volatility
in the demand for excess reserves and the potential
for error in the judgment of daily excess demand
have also become more important considerations in
the Desk’s management of reserves.
Recent experience with daily changes and forecast
errors of key operating factors that determine the
supply of balances at the Federal Reserve—the Trea-
sury balance at the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve
ﬂoat, currency in circulation, and the foreign RP
pool—is summarized in table 5. The average of the
absolute daily net changes in reserve balances arising
from movements in the four key operating factors
approached $2 billion in both 1997 and 1998, high-
lighting the importance of the Desk’s temporary
operations for smoothing out daily reserve patterns.
To some degree, the average was driven by outliers,
which topped out at about $20 billion in each of the
past two years, thus illustrating the potential for huge
swings. The biggest swings tended to be associated
with movements in the Treasury balance around key
tax dates.
Average absolute daily forecast errors underscore
the risks in managing reserve supply. The average of
the absolute daily net forecast error for the sum of
these same four operating factors in 1998 was about
$750 million, somewhat less than the errors in the
preceding two years but still of the same general
order of magnitude. The largest daily miss in 1998
was more than $31⁄2 billion. The Treasury balance
is usually the single most difﬁcult factor to estimate,
and it, along with ﬂoat, were the sources of the
biggest daily errors.
Comparable measures of changes in the daily
demand for excess reserves consistent with the funds
rate target and of errors in the daily estimation of
excess demand are not available. Important determi-
nants of the intraday pattern of the demand for excess
reserves are discussed later.
Temporary Open Market Operations Arranged
in 1998
The Desk typically relies on a mix of term and
overnight RPs to meet reserve shortages (chart 6).16
With total required balances remaining low in 1998,
the Desk continued to use overnight RPs extensively
to address reserve shortages to take into account
the daily volatility of operating factors and of excess
reserve demand and also potential projection errors.
For the same reasons, a term RP was rarely intended
to address entirely the reserve shortages estimated
beyond the initial date, and frequently an overnight
operation was arranged on the same day as a term
operation. Term RPs were usually designed to leave
reserve shortages of at least moderate size in subse-
quent days to be addressed with additional RPs. This
approach allowed the Desk to tailor the total amount
of all RPs outstanding on any day to ﬁt the most
up-to-date estimates of the daily reserve pattern.
15. The reserve supply projections presented in this section are
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York staff. In making
reserve management decisions, the Desk also uses estimates made by
the Board for all factors and by the Treasury for the Treasury balance.
Differences among the staff estimates underscore the risks inherent in
these daily estimates.
16. The expression overnight is used to denote any operation that
matures on the next business day.
5. Daily changes and forecast errors in key determinants of reserve balance supply, 1995–98
Millions of dollars, average and maximum of absolute values
Item
1995 1996 1997 1998
Average Maximum Average Maximum Average Maximum Average Maximum
Daily changes
Treasury balance ............ 1,233 12,639 1,002 9,780 1,484 17,393 1,413 22,571
Currency in circulation ...... 655 1,582 646 2,016 679 2,474 709 2,788
Foreign RP pool ............ 486 3,955 369 3,017 542 6,989 500 6,193
Float ....................... 515 3,748 790 8,154 548 4,605 791 5,449
Net value ................... 1,491 11,470 1,413 11,787 1,896 18,366 1,751 23,727
Daily forecast error
Treasury balance ............ 642 4,188 732 4,921 726 5,969 620 3,407
Currency in circulation ...... 206 932 213 932 200 980 217 999
Foreign RP pool ............ 124 617 113 617 203 1,433 150 935
Float ....................... 284 1,903 371 3,768 312 3,433 383 2,386
Net value ................... 743 4,139 898 5,042 848 5,991 744 3,664
Note. Projection errors are based on estimates by the staff of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
Highlights of Domestic Open Market Operations during 1998 225The frequency with which term RPs were arranged
was down a bit from 1997, partly reﬂecting the
smaller reserve shortages that occurred in 1998.
Three ﬁxed-term operations with maturities ranging
from thirty days to forty-ﬁve days were arranged in
December, using the Desk’s new authority for long-
term RPs, to address that portion of the year-end
reserve shortages that was expected to recede signiﬁ-
cantly in January 1999. These term RPs were among
the few such RPs that were set to mature in a main-
tenance period beyond the one in which they were
arranged.
The Desk used matched sale–purchase agreements
(MSPs) in 1998 for the ﬁrst time since May 1996.
These agreements, under which the Desk ﬁrst sells
securities and then purchases them at a predeter-
mined price from dealers at a later date, are used to
address temporary reserve surpluses. The ﬁrst two of
these operations took place in the January 14 period,
when huge upward revisions were made to weather-
related ﬂoat after term RPs had been put in place to
address what were expected to be reserve shortages.
Most of the MSPs were arranged in May, after earlier
projections of potentially huge reserve shortages dur-
ing the April–May tax season proved inaccurate (see
box ‘‘The Management of Reserves around the
April 15 Tax Season’’).
Technique of Intervention
The Desk retained its practice of normally arranging
temporary open market operations no more than once
a day, shortly after 10:30 a.m. when a complete set of
reserve estimates ﬁrst becomes available. For the new
long-term RPs that were used in 1998, operations
were arranged earlier in the day, around 8:30 a.m.,
because the Desk wanted to take advantage of the
more liquid ﬁnancing market that an earlier entry
time would offer. Moreover, these RPs were not
necessarily intended to meet all of the reserve short-
age estimated for the day on which they were
arranged, so there was no need to wait for a complete
set of reserve estimates. For the three long-term
operations arranged in 1998, propositions were
strong—measured in total volume and in rates offered
relative to current market quotes.
The Desk was always prepared to depart from its
usual practices as circumstances warranted. It entered
the market ahead of the usual intervention time on
numerous occasions apart from the three long-term
RPs. These early entries were motivated either by a
view that the expected reserve shortage on the day
required taking advantage of the greater market
liquidity that exists earlier in the morning or by a
belief that the ﬁrm ﬁnancing pressures that existed at
the time needed to be addressed promptly. On one
occasion, an early entry was followed up with another
operation at the usual market intervention time.
EXCESS RESERVES
Period-Average Excess Reserves
The uptrend in period-average levels of excess
reserves that became evident in 1997 and that has
been associated with the decline in total required



























1. Includes ﬁxed and withdrawable repurchase agreements.
2. Includes system and customer repurchase agreements.
7. Excess reserve holdings, by bank category, 1995–98










Note. Data are maintenance-period averages. Total excess reserves averaged
$1,012 million in 1995, $1,120 million in 1996, $1,322 million in 1997, and
$1,548 million in 1998.
1. ‘‘Other institutions’’ include small banks and thrift institutions, foreign-
related institutions, and nonreporters.
226 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1999balances intensiﬁed in 1998.17 However, the increase
in 1997 was observed broadly across different
classes of depository institutions, whereas in 1998
the increase in the underlying demand for excess
reserves occurred away from large institutions
and was concentrated among other institutions, nota-
bly small commercial banks and thrift institutions
(chart 7).18
The link between excess reserve levels and total
required balances of small commercial banks and
thrifts can be seen in chart 8. From 1995 to the
middle of 1997, the period of greatest decline in total
required balances for small commercial banks and
thrifts, only a small fraction of this decline was
reﬂected in higher excess levels for these institutions. 17. The Desk attempts to meet depository institutions’ demand for
excess reserves both for every maintenance period and for each day in
a period. For this reason, absent a true measure of excess demand,
actual levels of excess reserves can be taken as an approximation of
demand, notwithstanding the surprises to reserve supply and misjudg-
ments the Desk may make about demand that can cause actual excess
levels to diverge from true demands on any given day. For a discus-
sion of the uptrend in excess reserves in 1997, see Virginia Cheng,
Spence Hilton, and Ted Tulpan, ‘‘Open Market Operations during
1997,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 84 (July 1998), pp. 523–25.
18. The ‘‘large’’ bank category for which the Federal Reserve
collects reserve information includes about 130 of the largest deposi-
tory intitutions. The Federal Reserve also collects reserve information
separately for small commercial banks, thrift institutions, foreign-
related institutions, and nonreporting banks. In this article, these four
categories are sometimes aggregated into a grouping labeled ‘‘other
institutions.’’
The Management of Reserves around the April 15 Tax Season
The Desk’s initial reserve management strategy around the
April 15 tax date reﬂected its experience in April–May
1997. Tax receipts in April–May 1997 far exceeded pro-
jected inﬂows, and the resulting reserve shortages that
the Desk had to address with temporary operations were
unprecedented. Tax receipts in April–May 1998 were
expected to exceed their level of the previous year by a
substantial amount, and the Treasury’s balance at the Fed-
eral Reserve was expected to surge again, even though the
Treasury had arranged to have $64 billion in cash manage-
ment bills mature in mid-April ($14 billion more than in
1997) in order to control the buildup in its general cash
position.
To prepare for the expected surge in Treasury receipts,
the Desk purchased $13.2 billion of securities outright in
March and April, much more than it had acquired during
that time in 1997, to limit the reserve shortages that would
have to be addressed with RPs. Even so, sizable RPs were
still expected to be needed through mid-May to meet
reserve shortages that, according to the highest estimates,
were expected to peak at nearly $60 billion in late April.
Only after the planned outright operations were completed
did it become evident that reserve deﬁciencies would be
signiﬁcantly less than initially anticipated. To a large
degree, this projection error reﬂected the success that the
Treasury had in promoting participation in its Treasury Tax
& Loan (TT&L) program after it broadened the types of
collateral it accepted for this purpose. TT&L capacity was
more than $15 billion higher than anticipated, and this
higher capacity reduced the cash balance that had to be held
in the Federal Reserve account by a similar amount once the
Treasury’s total cash position exceeded the holding capac-
ity at private banks. At the same time, total corporate and
individual taxes fell about $20 billion short of the high end
of the set of estimates.
After making its outright purchases in April, the Desk
unexpectedly found itself having to drain reserves as a
result of the higher TT&L capacity and Treasury’s lower
total cash position. Large RPs were still needed to add
reserves in late April when the Treasury balance at the
Federal Reserve was at its peak. But for a few days before a
brief surge in cash holdings and again starting at the very
end of the month when large government outlays and
paydowns brought Treasury’s cash position down, matched
sale–purchase agreements were used to drain reserve
surpluses.
Reserve deﬁciencies (reserve requirements less reserve
supply) and temporary open market operations








Note. Actual and projected reserve deﬁciencies include all outright opera-
tions arranged through mid-May. A positive value denotes a level of reserve
supply below reserve requirements and a need to add reserves; a negative
value indicates a level of supply above requirements.
1. Reserve deﬁciencies are estimated as of April 14 by the staff of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Highlights of Domestic Open Market Operations during 1998 227From the middle of 1997 through 1998, even though
the pace of decline in required balances slowed, at
the margin the further decline had a greater effect on
excess reserve levels.
The link between excess reserves and total re-
quired balances among large depository institutions
as a group was less clear in 1998. The pace of decline
in total required balances at these institutions also
slowed around the middle of 1997. Although required
balances have fallen a bit since then, the average
level of excess reserves at these institutions was
unchanged on balance in 1998, after having risen in
1997 (chart 9).
Lower levels of total required balances have led to
higher excess reserve levels in two ways. Some
depository institutions working with lower required
balances have consistently chosen to hold a higher
level of excess reserves at the end of each day as a
precaution against contingencies that could reduce
their balances and send them into overdraft. This
behavior—an increase in precautionary demands for
excess reserves—is more characteristic of some insti-
tutions, especially smaller entities, that have limited
access to funding markets. However, among larger
banks and even some smaller institutions that have
the ability to adjust their balances throughout the day
by trading in the federal funds market, higher excess
reserve levels have been the byproduct mostly of
unanticipated late-day payment inﬂows. Unintended
high excess levels that individual institutions occa-
sionally have been left with on some days have been
harder to offset fully with negative excess positions
on remaining days within the same maintenance
period because required balances have been so low.
That is, depository institutions in general have been
more prone to becoming ‘‘locked in’’ inadvertently to
holding an undesirably high level of excess reserves
under low required balances.
In making its allowance for excess reserve demand
in a maintenance period, the Desk allows for ele-
vated precautionary demands, and it takes stock of
any lock-ins that arise as a maintenance period
progresses. But the Desk does not provide higher
excess reserve levels as it goes through a period in
anticipation of undesired lock-ins that have not yet
arisen, even if these are now seen as more likely to
develop at some point. Doing so would risk leaving
depository institutions holding undesired reserve sur-
pluses at the end of the period if they succeed in
avoiding lock-ins
In 1998 in recognition of recent trends, the allow-
ances in the nonborrowed reserve objective that the
Desk made at the start of each maintenance period for
period-average excess demand rose from about
$1 billion, a level that had prevailed for many years,
to levels that were often close to $11⁄2 billion. How-
ever, the Desk treated any initial allowance very
ﬂexibly, making more frequent informal modiﬁca-
tions as a period unfolded in response to actual
patterns of excess holdings and to the observed
behavior of the funds rate. To aid in its judgment, the
Desk used daily reports of excess holdings at small
8. Total required balances and excess reserves at small
















Note. Data are maintenance-period averages. Total required balances are
reserve requirements plus required clearing balances less applied vault cash.
Excess reserves at these institutions averaged $810 million in 1995, $847 mil-
lion in 1996, $951 million in 1997, and $1,207 million in 1998. The measures of
excess reserves and total required balances in this and the charts that follow are
drawn from internal data sources that reﬂect only revisions to the data made
within the ﬁrst ﬁve weeks after a maintenance period has ended.
9. Total required balances and excess reserves



















Note. Data are maintenance-period averages. Total required balances are
reserve requirements plus required clearing balances less applied vault cash.
Excess reserves at these institutions averaged $126 million in 1995, $190 mil-
lion in 1996, $267 million in 1997, and $247 million in 1998.
228 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1999and large institutions to evaluate their levels of
demand. It also used daily reports containing reserve
information for about twenty-ﬁve individual large
banks to determine whether any of these banks were
locked into holding excess reserves in a maintenance
period.
Daily Patterns of Excess Reserves
The preference that depository institutions have
shown for years for concentrating reserve balance
holdings late in a maintenance period was again
evident in 1998 (chart 10). This skewed pattern was
most pronounced at large banks, where cumulative
average excess positions were usually negative
throughout the period until the ﬁnal day.
In 1998, the Desk provided even higher levels of
excess reserves than it had in previous years on days
when payment ﬂows were heaviest and most unpre-
dictable (chart 11). These days include the ﬁrst and
last business day of each month, tax dates, and major
Treasury auction settlement dates. Most, but not all,
of the increase in excess reserves provided by the
Desk wound up at larger banks. In providing even
higher levels of excess reserves on high payment
ﬂow days, the Desk looked for other occasions within
the same maintenance period to leave fewer excess
reserves, consistent with depository institutions’
period-average demands, with the attendant risk that
unexpected reserve shortfalls on those days could




The trends noted in the previous discussion, both for
higher period-average excess levels and for elevated
levels on high payment ﬂow days, were reinforced
late in the year by the Desk’s reaction to recurring
bouts of rate ﬁrmness that emerged in overnight
funding markets. The background for these pressures
is discussed more fully in the following section,
which reviews the behavior of the federal funds
rate late in 1998. The Desk often responded to any
upward rate pressure in the morning by providing a
higher level of excess reserves for that day. These
funds market pressures were typically most intense
around high payment ﬂow days, so that the Desk was
particularly careful to leave total balances high on
those days. Sometimes suitable opportunities to work
off the resulting high excess levels did not arise
because the funds rate often remained ﬁrm even in
the presence of the accumulation of excess reserves.
As a result, average excess levels for some periods
in October and November were particularly elevated.
But the trend toward higher excess levels previously
described was evident even before the ﬁnal quarter of
the year.
THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
Daily behavior of the federal funds rate is measured
by the absolute deviation of the effective (trade-
weighted average) rate from the target rate speciﬁed
in FOMC directives and by the standard deviation of
the rates on each day’s transactions around the effec-
tive rate. Through the ﬁrst three quarters of 1998, the
10. Average levels of daily excess reserve holdings,
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11. Excess reserves on high payment ﬂow days, 1995–98








Note. Data are annual averages. High payment ﬂow days include the ﬁrst
and last business day of each month (excluding quarter-end dates), major tax
dates, and midquarter settlement dates for Treasury refundings. The quarter-
ends are dropped even though payment ﬂows are extremely heavy on these days
because the levels of excess reserves some banks held on these days for
balance-sheet-statement purposes was very volatile.
Highlights of Domestic Open Market Operations during 1998 229daily behavior of the federal funds rate was similar to
that of 1997 (chart 12). But both the deviations from
target and the intraday standard deviations increased
perceptibly during the ﬁnal quarter of the year when
pressures associated with volatility in other ﬁnancial
markets began to affect ﬁnancing ﬂows and the trad-
ing behavior of participants in the federal funds
market.19
Daily Deviations and Volatility of the Federal
Funds Rate in 1998
Data needed to calculate the absolute deviations of
the effective funds rate from target and the standard
deviation of each day’s rates are compiled every
morning by the Desk from a broad sample of brokers
who arrange transactions between participants in the
federal funds market. Each of these statistics captures
somewhat different aspects of the behavior of the
funds market. For example, the deviation of the daily
effective rate from target is often strongly inﬂuenced
by participants’ expectations about whether reserve
19. In this article, the persistence of higher daily volatility in the
funds market is dated as having begun on September 29, although its
actual emergence was somewhat more gradual.
12. Absolute values of deviations of the daily effective federal funds rate from target and the standard deviations
of the daily effective funds rate, all business days, 1997–98












Absolute value of effective target rate (basis points)
Standard deviation (basis points)
All business days in 1997
All business days in 1998
Median absolute deviation of effective rate from target = 7 basis points1
Median standard deviation = 9 basis points
1997 median absolute deviation of
effective rate from target = 7 basis points
1997 median standard deviation = 9 basis points
Jan. 1–Sept. 28
Sept. 29–Dec. 31
Note. Daily observations form a discrete rather than a continuous distribu-
tion. For this reason, when calculating the percentage of days that fell either
above or below a median value, observations having values equal to the median
are apportioned equally above and below the median. All values have been
restricted to ﬁt on a reduced scale to provide more detail at the lower values
where most observations are concentrated.
In 1997 the percentage of days on which the deviation of the effective funds
rate from the target and the standard deviation were both either above or below
the median values are the following:
Jan. 1–Sept. 28 Sept. 29–Dec. 31
(percent) (percent)
Both below median 35 31
Both above median 35 32
In 1998 the percentage of days on which the deviation of the effective funds
rate from the target and the standard deviation were both either above or below
the median values are the following:
Jan. 1–Sept. 28 Sept. 29–Dec. 31
(percent) (percent)
Both below 1997 median 29 10
Both above 1997 median 32 73
1. Average absolute deviation of effective rate from target is 12 basis points.
230 Federal Reserve Bulletin April 1999supply will prove to be either scarce or plentiful on
any day. Such expectations, which may be formed
largely on the basis of past experience, often estab-
lish the rate at which transactions will be arranged
through most of the day. The daily standard deviation
will capture shifts in these expectations during the
day, and it is inﬂuenced, as is the effective rate, by
actual reserve conditions as they become apparent in
late-day trading. Changes in underlying reserve con-
ditions and the behavior of market participants are
often reﬂected in changes in the behavior of these
two daily statistics.
From January through late September 1998, the
median values for both the standard deviations and
deviations of the effective rate from target were
within 1 basis point of their median values for 1997
(table 6).20 This similarity in behavior of the funds
rate held despite the further modest decline in the
level of total required balances in 1998. Still, volatil-
ity in these measures remained above the levels that
prevailed before 1996, when the rapid decline in total
required balances ﬁrst began to have a notable effect
on the daily behavior of the funds rate.
By late September, heightened aversion to credit
risk and accompanying dislocations in other ﬁnancial
markets began to affect the funding needs and behav-
ior of key participants in the federal funds market.
Some depository institutions encountered reduced
access to term funding, and their demand for over-
night funding rose as a result. Lenders in the over-
night federal funds and Eurodollar markets in some
cases cut credit lines to certain borrowers. At the
same time, banks’ aversion to borrowing at the dis-
count window appears to have intensiﬁed out of
concern that borrowing might be seen as a sign of
poor ﬁnancial health.
The intraday trading strategies many market par-
ticipants adopted often lent a very ﬁrm bias to rates
in the morning as highly risk-averse borrowers bid
aggressively for funds early in the day. Their actions
sometimes lifted the entire rate structure paid by all
borrowers for much of the day, especially as lenders
in the market came to recognize this caution. This
pattern was most prevalent on days characterized by
high payment ﬂows, when uncertainties about daily
reserve positions are typically greatest.
The Desk responded to these conditions by provid-
ing higher excess reserves on days when these ﬁnanc-
ing pressures were most evident. This response rein-
forced the tendency of the funds rate to fall off late
in the day when the level of balances left in place
proved higher than ﬁnal demands. Furthermore, the
high period-average levels of excess reserves that
resulted also encouraged very soft conditions in the
funds rate on several maintenance period settlement
days in October and November. The funds market
went through several cycles of ﬁrmness sustained
over several days, often triggered by high payment
ﬂow dates, followed by periods of softness.21 By late
November, the Desk’s provisions of added reserves
and the adjustments made by some regular borrowers
in the funds market to reduce their reliance on over-
night ﬁnancing helped ease these upward rate pres-
sures, but they remained a feature of the funds market
through the year-end.
The volatile rate environment created by market
participants’ defensive trading strategies and the
Desk’s response to them was reﬂected in both larger
deviations of the effective daily funds rate from target
and higher daily standard deviations. The median
value of the daily standard deviations was 22 basis
points from late September through December, and
the median absolute deviation of the funds rate was
16 basis points, both well above the corresponding
levels for all of 1997 and through the ﬁrst three
20. In making comparisons between different time periods, median
values are used instead of means because of the possible inﬂuence of a
small number of very large outliers on the calculation of the mean. All
calculations are based on business day observations, with no adjust-
ment for the effect of holidays or weekends on the calculation of
effective rates averaged over longer time periods.
21. Softer rates sometimes emerged after participants began to
incorporate expectations, which were often incorrect, that the Desk
was going out of its way to make generous reserve provisions. On
many days when these expectations were not accurate, the funds rate
nonetheless remained soft as participants at ﬁrst traded on the expecta-
tion or perception of Desk generosity and then as actual levels of
excess reserves, even if quite low, still proved sufﬁcient to cover
end-of-day needs. Conversely, market expectations or perceptions of
low levels of liquidity kept the funds rate ﬁrm on some days when
excess levels were high.
6. Deviations of the daily effective federal funds rate from









Median of standard deviations .... 9 12 10 22
Median of absolute deviations
of the effective rate
from target ................. 7 8 6 16
Average of absolute deviations
of the effective rate
from target ................. 12 13 10 22
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volatility observed in the daily behavior of the funds
rate during the ﬁnal quarter was likely aggravated by
required balance levels, which hovered near historic
lows, the immediate cause was the changed market
climate.
Average Levels of the Federal Funds Rate
Because of these pressures on the funds rate late
in 1998, the Desk was less successful in maintaining
the average daily effective rate around the target
(chart 13). For the maintenance periods that covered
the fourth quarter, the absolute deviations of the
period-average effective rates from target averaged
10 basis points.23 The average absolute deviation
from target of the period-average effective funds rate
was 5 basis points for earlier periods in 1998, and it
was 4 basis points in 1997.
Intraperiod Patterns of the Federal Funds Rate
Intraperiod patterns of the effective funds rate, mea-
sured by the deviation of the effective rate from target
averaged separately for each day in a maintenance
period, were similar to those in preceding years
(chart 14). For example, soft conditions continued to
prevail on many Fridays. The sharpest departure from
past patterns appeared on settlement Wednesdays, the
last day of a maintenance period. The effective rate
on those days in 1998 was, on average, below target.
However, the low average for settlement days in
1998 to a large degree reﬂected developments that
occurred late in the year. During the ﬁnal three
months of 1998, the funds rate on settlement Wednes-
days averaged 27 basis points below the target level.
This development reinforces the judgment that the
period-average levels of excess reserves in these
maintenance periods exceeded demands. Over the
ﬁrst three quarters of 1998, the effective rates from
these settlement days averaged 6 basis points above
target, similar to their average deviation in 1997.
SUMMARY
The conduct of open market operations throughout
1998 was inﬂuenced by the continued growth of
sweep programs, which reduced further the level of
total required balances, and late in the year by height-
ened aversion to credit risk in ﬁnancial markets,
which affected the activity of some participants in the
federal funds market. Both developments contributed
to higher levels of excess reserves in the banking
system and reinforced the Desk’s growing reliance
on very short-term operations to balance daily swings
in reserve supply and demand. Through the ﬁrst three
quarters of 1998, intraday volatility in the federal
funds rate and deviations in the daily effective rate
from target were similar to those of the previous year.
But late in the year, funds rate volatility rose with the
growing aversion to credit risk among ﬁnancial mar-
ket participants.
22. Historically, the funds rate has tended to be a bit more volatile
in the fourth quarter of a year compared with the preceding three
quarters. However, median values of the standard deviations and of
the absolute deviations of the effective rate from target in the ﬁnal
quarter were never more than a couple of basis points higher than in
the ﬁrst three quarters in any year from 1995 through 1997.
23. This calculation is based on the seven maintenance periods
running from the period ended October 7 through the period ended
December 30.
13. Maintenance period averages of the effective federal
funds rate versus the target rate, 1995–98










Average of absolute differences between
period effective rates and the target
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14. Average levels of the daily effective federal funds rate
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A.1. U.S. Treasury bills in the System Open Market
Account, December 31, 1998









1/07/991 ....................... 109,320 .3
1/14/991 ....................... 156,860 .7
1/21/991 ....................... 6,533,390 13.8
1/28/99 ........................ 7,342,815 31.8
2/04/99 ........................ 14,018,010 26.0
2/11/99 ........................ 7,534,485 32.2
2/18/99 ........................ 7,621,564 32.5
2/25/99 ........................ 7,688,180 33.5
3/04/99 ........................ 13,214,955 32.5
3/11/99 ........................ 7,591,780 32.6
3/18/99 ........................ 7,304,310 32.0
3/25/99 ........................ 6,954,235 30.9
4/01/99 ........................ 12,662,430 32.1
4/08/99 ........................ 3,645,000 31.3
4/15/99 ........................ 4,105,000 33.7
4/22/99 ........................ 3,695,000 31.6
4/29/99 ........................ 8,440,000 31.7
5/06/99 ........................ 3,935,000 32.1
5/13/99 ........................ 3,800,000 32.2
5/20/99 ........................ 3,855,000 32.5
5/27/99 ........................ 9,090,000 33.5
6/03/99 ........................ 3,840,000 32.4
6/10/99 ........................ 3,900,000 30.9
6/17/99 ........................ 3,775,000 31.2
6/24/99 ........................ 7,925,000 30.9
7/01/99 ........................ 3,540,000 32.0
7/22/99 ........................ 5,305,000 33.7
8/19/99 ........................ 5,565,000 35.3
9/16/99 ........................ 5,390,000 34.9
10/14/99 ........................ 5,650,000 33.9
11/12/99 ........................ 5,225,000 32.2
12/09/99 ........................ 5,360,000 32.8
Total Treasury bills .............. 194,772,3341 ...
Net change since
12/31/97.................... -2,350,364 . . .
Note. Data are on a statement-date basis.
1. Holdings of Treasury bills were reduced by the following amounts of
matched sale–purchase agreements, which are returned the next day:
$12,700,000 of Jan. 7 Treasury bills, $7,700,000 of Jan. 14 Treasury bills, and
$527,110 of Jan. 21 Treasury bills.
A.2. U.S. Treasury bonds in the System Open Market
Account, December 31, 1998












11.750 ........... 2/15/01 165,803 11.0 5,000
13.125 ........... 5/15/01 166,926 9.5 1,200
13.375 ........... 8/15/01 256,092 14.6 . . .
15.750 ........... 11/15/01 172,904 9.9 . . .
14.250 ........... 2/15/02 184,800 10.5 25,000
11.625 ........... 11/15/02 347,850 12.6 . . .
10.750 ........... 2/15/03 739,250 24.6 . . .
10.750 ........... 5/15/03 380,800 11.7 49,800
11.125 ........... 8/15/03 514,300 14.7 . . .
11.875 ........... 11/15/03 870,340 12.0 119,000
12.375 ........... 5/15/04 769,786 20.5 . . .
13.750 ........... 8/15/04 528,000 13.2 . . .
11.625 ........... 11/15/04 994,600 12.0 47,400
8.250 ........... 5/15/05 1,513,660 35.8 . . .
12.000 ........... 5/15/05 728,476 17.1 . . .
10.750 ........... 8/15/05 1,187,000 12.8 . . .
9.375 ........... 2/15/06 133,000 2.8 113,000
7.625 ........... 2/15/07 1,396,164 33.0 . . .
7.875 ........... 11/15/07 378,500 25.3 . . .
8.375 ........... 8/15/08 788,500 37.5 . . .
8.750 ........... 11/15/08 1,588,500 30.4 . . .
9.125 ........... 5/15/09 921,205 20.0 . . .
10.375 ........... 11/15/09 1,075,939 25.6 . . .
11.750 ........... 2/15/10 717,400 28.8 . . .
10.000 ........... 5/15/10 1,176,556 39.4 . . .
12.750 ........... 11/15/10 1,260,865 26.6 . . .
13.875 ........... 5/15/11 1,073,542 23.3 . . .
14.000 ........... 11/15/11 975,091 19.9 . . .
10.375 ........... 11/15/12 1,611,741 14.6 . . .
12.000 ........... 8/15/13 3,040,772 20.6 . . .
13.250 ........... 5/15/14 869,450 17.4 . . .
12.500 ........... 8/15/14 905,720 17.7 . . .
11.750 ........... 11/15/14 1,195,000 19.9 . . .
11.250 ........... 2/15/15 1,335,733 10.5 . . .
10.625 ........... 8/15/15 1,167,400 16.3 . . .
9.875 ........... 11/15/15 941,500 13.6 . . .
9.250 ........... 2/15/16 880,000 12.1 . . .
7.250 ........... 5/15/16 1,098,000 5.8 103,000
7.500 ........... 11/15/16 1,378,000 7.3 115,000
8.750 ........... 5/15/17 1,855,000 10.2 405,000
8.875 ........... 8/15/17 1,494,000 10.7 585,000
9.125 ........... 5/15/18 728,900 8.4 232,000
9.000 ........... 11/15/18 304,000 3.4 48,000
8.875 ........... 2/15/19 1,224,000 6.4 291,000
8.125 ........... 8/15/19 1,735,900 8.6 45,000
8.500 ........... 2/15/20 1,095,879 10.7 135,000
8.750 ........... 5/15/20 1,211,600 11.9 145,000
8.750 ........... 8/15/20 1,366,600 12.5 . . .
7.875 ........... 2/15/21 830,500 7.5 55,000
8.125 ........... 5/15/21 1,103,000 9.2 165,000
8.125 ........... 8/15/21 940,000 7.7 260,000
8.000 ........... 11/15/21 1,695,000 5.2 545,000
7.250 ........... 8/15/22 605,000 5.8 145,000
7.625 ........... 11/15/22 810,000 7.6 150,000
7.125 ........... 2/15/23 1,981,000 10.8 568,000
6.250 ........... 8/15/23 1,447,000 6.3 412,000
7.500 ........... 11/15/24 565,000 4.9 60,000
7.625 ........... 2/15/25 875,000 7.5 60,000
6.875 ........... 8/15/25 1,345,000 10.7 140,000
6.000 ........... 2/15/26 999,000 7.7 65,000
6.750 ........... 8/15/26 1,050,000 9.6 85,000
6.500 ........... 11/15/26 1,470,000 12.8 . . .
6.625 ........... 2/15/27 530,000 5.1 50,000
6.375 ........... 8/15/27 730,000 6.8 . . .
6.125 ........... 11/15/27 2,505,000 11.1 1,325,000
5.500 ........... 8/15/28 1,771,808 15.0 1,771,808
5.250 ........... 11/15/28 945,000 8.6 945,000
Matured in 1998 .. . . . . . . . . . -30,750
Total Treasury
bonds ....... . . . 68,642,352 . . . 9,235,458
Note. Data are on a statement-date basis.
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6.375 ............ 1/15/99 892,045 8.5 . . .
5.000 ............ 1/31/99 848,000 6.6 91,000
5.875 ............ 1/31/99 1,917,000 9.9 1,172,000
5.000 ............ 2/15/99 3,644,140 16.6 . . .
8.875 ............ 2/15/99 1,048,600 10.8 97,000
5.500 ............ 2/28/99 915,000 7.7 200,000
5.875 ............ 2/28/99 1,656,000 8.3 457,000
5.875 ............ 3/31/99 1,875,000 14.7 . . .
6.250 ............ 3/31/99 1,420,000 7.2 . . .
7.000 ............ 4/15/99 1,073,700 10.6 . . .
6.375 ............ 4/30/99 1,545,000 8.0 320,000
6.500 ............ 4/30/99 1,324,620 10.8 105,000
6.375 ............ 5/15/99 2,869,124 12.3 . . .
9.125 ............ 5/15/99 1,637,500 16.3 . . .
6.250 ............ 5/31/99 1,020,900 5.5 282,900
6.750 ............ 5/31/99 871,990 7.1 185,000
6.000 ............ 6/30/99 839,435 4.7 195,000
6.750 ............ 6/30/99 1,644,820 12.6 . . .
6.375 ............ 7/15/99 409,000 4.1 60,000
5.875 ............ 7/31/99 1,421,970 8.5 325,000
6.875 ............ 7/31/99 1,531,400 12.4 . . .
6.000 ............ 8/15/99 2,676,110 11.8 444,000
8.000 ............ 8/15/99 943,600 9.3 85,000
5.875 ............ 8/31/99 1,439,630 8.4 135,000
6.875 ............ 8/31/99 1,101,480 8.9 150,000
5.750 ............ 9/30/99 667,380 3.8 25,000
7.125 ............ 9/30/99 1,349,752 10.6 271,000
6.000 ............ 10/15/99 406,115 3.9 . . .
5.625 ............ 10/31/99 732,000 4.4 230,000
7.500 ............ 10/31/99 1,107,315 9.2 549,000
5.875 ............ 11/15/99 2,790,968 12.2 . . .
7.875 ............ 11/15/99 814,000 7.6 . . .
5.625 ............ 11/30/99 1,131,175 6.7 583,000
7.750 ............ 11/30/99 1,408,145 11.9 232,000
5.625 ............ 12/31/99 795,780 4.8 . . .
7.750 ............ 12/31/99 1,379,665 11.1 . . .
6.375 ............ 1/15/00 689,545 6.8 . . .
5.375 ............ 1/31/00 1,140,730 6.5 1,140,730
7.750 ............ 1/31/00 1,125,440 9.3 261,000
5.875 ............ 2/15/00 1,232,796 6.0 386,000
8.500 ............ 2/15/00 1,204,000 11.3 218,000
5.500 ............ 2/29/00 1,497,320 8.4 1,497,320
7.125 ............ 2/29/00 1,477,290 11.9 155,000
5.500 ............ 3/31/00 1,998,220 11.6 1,998,220
6.875 ............ 3/31/00 1,401,510 10.7 60,000
5.500 ............ 4/15/00 368,000 3.5 8,000
5.625 ............ 4/30/00 1,321,000 8.5 1,321,000
6.750 ............ 4/30/00 1,524,250 12.3 500,000
6.375 ............ 5/15/00 2,807,000 13.5 . . .
8.875 ............ 5/15/00 480,000 4.6 . . .
5.500 ............ 5/31/00 1,321,000 8.0 1,321,000
6.250 ............ 5/31/00 911,460 7.2 68,000
5.375 ............ 6/30/00 1,383,000 9.3 1,383,000
5.875 ............ 6/30/00 740,100 5.9 . . .
5.375 ............ 7/31/00 1,976,750 10.6 1,976,750
6.125 ............ 7/31/00 698,000 5.7 243,000
6.000 ............ 8/15/00 2,147,845 11.9 837,900
8.750 ............ 8/15/00 1,212,400 10.9 54,000
5.125 ............ 8/31/00 2,994,300 15.0 2,994,300
6.250 ............ 8/31/00 721,000 6.1 71,000
4.500 ............ 9/30/00 2,241,500 11.6 2,241,500
6.125 ............ 9/30/00 1,009,000 8.4 . . .
4.000 ............ 10/31/00 2,462,900 12.0 2,462,900
5.750 ............ 10/31/00 729,430 6.0 192,000
5.750 ............ 11/15/00 1,888,200 11.8 237,000
8.500 ............ 11/15/00 882,300 7.7 1,300
4.625 ............ 11/30/00 2,032,200 10.1 2,032,200












4.625 ............ 12/31/00 2,554,662 13.1 2,554,662
5.500 ............ 12/31/00 891,000 7.0 . . .
5.250 ............ 1/31/01 800,000 6.2 . . .
5.375 ............ 2/15/01 1,532,560 10.0 1,532,560
7.750 ............ 2/15/01 993,500 8.8 64,000
5.625 ............ 2/28/01 1,061,000 8.3 160,000
6.375 ............ 3/31/01 1,630,000 11.5 30,000
6.250 ............ 4/30/01 1,257,500 9.1 319,000
5.625 ............ 5/15/01 2,270,117 17.7 2,270,117
8.000 ............ 5/15/01 1,473,000 11.9 316,000
6.500 ............ 5/31/01 1,074,900 7.8 163,000
6.625 ............ 6/30/01 1,175,000 8.2 . . .
6.625 ............ 7/31/01 957,000 6.8 84,000
7.875 ............ 8/15/01 1,469,400 11.9 94,400
6.500 ............ 8/31/01 1,041,300 7.5 181,000
6.375 ............ 9/30/01 1,144,100 7.9 107,100
6.250 ............ 10/31/01 949,000 6.5 66,000
7.500 ............ 11/15/01 2,824,000 11.7 383,000
5.875 ............ 11/30/01 729,000 5.2 253,000
6.125 ............ 12/31/01 900,000 6.4 275,000
6.250 ............ 1/31/02 1,105,000 8.2 328,000
6.250 ............ 2/28/02 944,400 6.9 141,400
6.625 ............ 3/31/02 1,400,900 9.8 420,000
6.625 ............ 4/30/02 1,292,500 9.0 257,500
7.500 ............ 5/15/02 1,341,009 11.5 325,000
6.500 ............ 5/31/02 1,132,000 8.4 183,000
6.250 ............ 6/30/02 867,000 6.6 81,000
6.000 ............ 7/31/02 442,000 3.6 147,000
6.375 ............ 8/15/02 2,612,000 11.0 365,000
6.250 ............ 8/31/02 942,000 7.4 241,000
5.875 ............ 9/30/02 635,000 5.0 175,000
5.750 ............ 10/31/02 710,000 6.1 320,000
5.750 ............ 11/30/02 644,000 5.3 244,000
5.625 ............ 12/31/02 700,000 5.8 115,000
5.500 ............ 1/31/03 802,000 6.1 802,000
6.250 ............ 2/15/03 2,160,000 9.2 15,000
5.500 ............ 2/28/03 1,199,000 8.8 1,199,000
5.500 ............ 3/31/03 1,385,000 9.8 1,385,000
5.750 ............ 4/30/03 1,010,000 8.0 1,010,000
5.500 ............ 5/31/03 1,115,000 8.5 1,115,000
5.375 ............ 6/30/03 1,309,000 10.0 1,309,000
5.250 ............ 8/15/03 2,834,000 14.3 2,834,000
5.750 ............ 8/15/03 3,685,000 13.2 . . .
4.250 ............ 11/15/03 1,518,385 8.2 1,518,385
5.875 ............ 2/15/04 650,000 5.0 . . .
7.250 ............ 5/15/04 1,940,550 13.5 35,000
7.250 ............ 8/15/04 835,000 6.3 25,000
7.875 ............ 11/15/04 1,753,040 12.3 . . .
7.500 ............ 2/15/05 1,291,600 9.4 141,600
6.500 ............ 5/15/05 2,000,000 13.6 . . .
6.500 ............ 8/15/05 1,800,000 12.0 . . .
5.875 ............ 11/15/05 1,700,000 11.2 . . .
5.625 ............ 2/15/06 1,708,000 11.0 208,000
6.875 ............ 5/15/06 2,075,000 13.0 . . .
7.000 ............ 7/15/06 2,724,752 12.0 459,000
6.500 ............ 10/15/06 2,577,800 11.5 145,000
6.250 ............ 2/15/07 840,000 6.4 300,000
6.625 ............ 5/15/07 1,750,000 12.5 . . .
6.125 ............ 8/15/07 2,518,000 9.8 343,000
5.500 ............ 2/15/08 1,420,000 10.5 1,420,000
5.625 ............ 5/15/08 4,084,000 15.0 4,084,000
4.750 ............ 11/15/08 1,135,000 8.4 1,135,000
Matured in 1998 .. . . . . . . . . . -52,079,735
Total Treasury
notes ........ . . . 184,960,020 . . . 12,427,009
Note. Data are on a statement-date basis.
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3.625 ................. 4/15/28 820,000 4.9 820,000
Matured in 1998 ....... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total Treasury IIB ..... . . . 820,000 . . . 820,000
Treasury inﬂation
index notes (IIN)
3.625 ................. 7/15/02 900,000 5.4 . . .
3.375 ................. 1/15/07 832,000 5.3 82,000
3.625 ................. 1/15/08 1,135,000 6.8 1,135,000
Matured in 1998 ....... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total Treasury IIN ..... . . . 2,867,000 . . . 1,217,000
Total Treasury bonds,
notes, IIN, and
IIB1 ............. . . . 257,289,372 . . . . . .
Note. Data are on a statement-date basis.
1. Total amounts of Treasury bonds and notes are from tables A.2 and A.3
respectively.
A.5. U.S. federal agency holdings in the System Open
Market Account, December 31, 1998
Thousands of dollars except as noted














9.550 .............. 3/10/99 25,000 3.6 . . .
8.700 .............. 6/10/99 23,000 2.8 . . .
8.450 .............. 7/12/99 5,000 1.0 . . .
8.350 .............. 11/10/99 7,000 .4 . . .
6.100 .............. 2/10/00 25,000 5.0 . . .
9.050 .............. 4/10/00 10,000 1.3 . . .
9.200 .............. 9/11/00 10,000 2.5 . . .
6.625 .............. 4/10/03 . . . 0 -30,000 1
6.450 .............. 6/10/03 . . . 0 -25,000 1
5.800 .............. 12/10/03 10,000 1.3 . . .
7.550 .............. 6/10/04 24,650 3.1 . . .
8.250 .............. 10/12/04 30,000 7.5 . . .
6.850 .............. 9/12/05 20,000 5.0 . . .
6.700 .............. 11/10/05 100,000 25.0 . . .
10.350 .............. 12/10/15 . . . 0 -10,000
8.200 .............. 3/10/16 . . . 0 -15,000
Matured in 1998 ..... . . . . . . . . . -328,000
Total, FNMA ........ . . . 289,650 . . . -328,000
Federal Home Loan
Banks (FHLBanks)
9.300 ............... 1/25/99 2,000 .6 . . .
8.600 ............... 6/25/99 3,900 1.2 . . .
8.450 ............... 7/26/99 5,000 2.0 . . .
8.600 ............... 8/25/99 11,000 4.5 . . .
8.375 ............... 10/25/99 10,000 3.7 . . .
8.600 ............... 1/25/00 6,000 2.0 . . .
Matured in 1998 ..... . . . . . . . . . -19,000




8.650 ............... 10/01/99 10,000 2.9 . . .
Matured in 1998 ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total, FCA .......... . . . 10,000 . . . . . .
Total agency issues . . . . 337,550 . . . -347,000
Total Treasury and
agency issues 2 . . . . 452,399,256 . . . . . .
Note. Data are on a statement-date basis.
1. Called issue.
2. Totals for Treasury issues are from tables A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4.
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